

# “EUPST 2011 – 2013”



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**TACTICAL, TECHNICAL PROCEDURES  
FOR CSDP POLICE OPERATIONS**



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## 1. BASIC SELF DEFENSE TECHNIQUES

Every police force/service has its own self-defense technique and it is difficult to identify common techniques. Nevertheless every police officer should be able to defend himself using the minimum amount of force according to the circumstances and some common principles can be identified.

In order to be effective in self-defense, every police officer should be aware of next aspects:

1. human body's points of impact;
  2. physical space between opponents ;
  3. means employed to constraint a person ("bared hands" or adapted arms).
1. The human body can be divided in different areas according to the damages as effect of the impact. The head, the spine, the groin and the breast bone are quite sensitive areas for the possible permanent consequences on health caused by a strong direct strike. For this reason they should be targeted only in case of extreme self-defense with moderate strength.

Other parts, like the breast, the abdomen, elbows, wrists, knees and insteps, when stroke, can cause intense pain but with limited effects. Muscles on arms and legs, hands and feet should be the normal targets in case of physical defense.

Common rules, valid for every use of force, are condensed in the acronym P.L.A.N. standing for **P**roportionate, **L**egal, **A**ccountable and **N**ecessary.

2. The physical space between the operator and the aggressor can be divided in three zones:

- safety zone: the visual, verbal and hearing engagements are the only possibility. The opponent is not close enough to strike with legs or arms;
  - zone of possible physical contact: the opponent is close enough to strike with legs or stabbing weapons;
  - close zone : The opponent is in close contact.
3. It is important that every police officer should have some training, even on the use of non-lethal weapons (i.e. baton), for avoiding direct strikes or responding with appropriate techniques. Their aim is not hurting the aggressor but stopping him.

For this reason, police officers should be able to restraint the aggressor using techniques like extending his arm or locking the shoulder, in order to escort him to a safety area for subsequent proceedings.

## **2. CHECKPOINT (CP)**

### **Purpose**

The purpose of a checkpoint is to allow controlled access, or deny access, by persons and/or vehicles to a particular object/area.

Means:

- traffic signs;
- directional lights;
- traffic signs/ directions;
- concrete blocks, cables, sawhorses, Hesco barriers;
- concertinas;
- stop sticks, nail boards.

### **Methods and basic principles**

A CP is a point set up on the approach to, or passage through, a particular object/area, which people and/or vehicles can only pass if they have been checked.

The location of a CP must fulfil the following requirements:

- be on the most likely approach to, or passage through, the object/area to be secured;
- be recognisable as a CP (signs, lights, etc.)
- one in which the possibilities of by-passing the CP or avoiding control checks are minimal;
- provide sufficient visual and/or fire cover;
- have enough, clearly arranged marshalling and control areas;
- (if there is more than one checkpoint in use) be physically separated by marking and signposting and/or obstacles;

- CP must have sufficient lighting to operate in the dark;
- have sufficient observation points to guarantee early identification of violent opponents;
- it must be possible to seal off the CP completely;
- it is preferable to use 'natural' control locations on the basis of the ground and/or infrastructure. Such as passages through woodland, bridges, tunnels, viaducts and narrow parts of the road.

When ordering a CP to be set up the commander (CDR) will always describe/specify/provide:

- the exact task for which the CP is to be set up;
- clear information about what is to be controlled and how;
- the location of the CP;
- the time at which the CP should become operational;
- the duty roster of personnel;
- the available resources;
- the applicable security instructions and rules governing the use of force;
- what to do in the event of a recognised threat.
- how and when it is possible to return to the GP, SIE or squad.

### **CP Points for particular attention.**

When it comes to setting up a CP and keeping it operational, the following points are particularly important:

- the control of persons and vehicles must take place on the CP location;
- CP should be protected by (blinding) lights directed at the approach road;
- there should only be functional personnel on the CP, to prevent unsafe situations arising or interference with the firing sector.

**Fixed elements.**

The CP to be set up must include a number of fixed elements. With variations depending on the location, the assignment and the threat, those fixed elements are as follows:

- A warning element
- A delay element
- A control element
- A back-up element
- A sealing-off element

**Warning element (WE).**

The purpose of the WE is the early discovery of an approaching threat.

The WE should preferably be set up at a distance and out of sight to avoid hostile attacks being directed against it. The WE consists of at least 2 group members and possibly a group vehicle. If the terrain or the nature of the assignment permits and there is already a good enough view of approaching persons or vehicles from the checkpoint itself, it may be possible to omit the setting up of a WE.

**Delay Element (DE)**

It consists of physical measures to ensure that the persons and/or vehicles to be checked are forced to move at a walking pace through the CP. These measures may include such things as traffic signs, road signs and/or lights.

Depending on the supposed threat, the nature of the assignment and the checkpoint location, the checkpoint may be scaled up and obstacles put in place, such as concrete blocks and/or sea containers. The group vehicle may also serve as a delay element and possibly a cover element as well.

**Control element (CE)**

The purpose of the control element is the actual control of persons and/or vehicles to guarantee controlled passage/access. Such controlled passage/access keeps out unauthorised persons and potentially dangerous elements. This creates a safe working environment for own personnel, the object/area in question and third parties.

A control team consists of at least three group members, whereby:

- one group member performs the control activities;
- one group member observes.

Depending on the threat, the nature of the assignment and the control location, the CDR may scale up and deploy more personnel and/or material.

Depending on the analysis of the threat, the CDR may be scaled up with:

- bomb experts;
- explosives sniffer dog;
- searches;
- detection gates/ body scan;
- camera systems and positions.

**Cover element (CVE)**

The purpose of the cover element is to support the control element and take countermeasures against identified threats.

The cover element consists of a cover team comprised of at least two group members, possibly supported by a group vehicle and gunner. The cover team positioned immediately behind the CP such that there is a good view of the CP and the activities of the control team.

The tasks of the cover team include:

- protecting the control element;
- dealing with vehicles and/or persons who have broken through or are going around the CP;
- removal of arrested persons from the CP.

**Cover Element Points for Particular Attention:**

- the cover team must be within firing distance of the control point, possibly supported by a group vehicle;
- when it is dark there must be a flare gun and flares available;
- ‘mixing’ of group members of the cover element and the CP should be avoided;
- The SC or GPC should be in the immediate vicinity of the cover team.
- The field of fire and firing sectors should be taken into account.

**Sealing-off element (SE).**

The purpose of the sealing-off element is the rapid and effective sealing-off of the checkpoint, so that adversaries and/or vehicle can be denied access to the guarded/protected object.

The sealing-off can be realised using such temporarily installed barriers such as:

- roadblock tiles;
- sawhorses;
- concertinas;
- cables;
- blocks;
- nail boards.

If there is an immediate threat the group vehicle can be used as a sealing-off element, by positioning it in such a way the CP is adequately sealed off.

**Sealing-off Element Points for Special Attention.**

The sealing-off procedure should take into account the withdrawal of the warning element during hostilities. The signal in response to which the required sealing-off should be realised is specified in the security instructions and rules governing the use of force.

### **3. VEHICLE SEARCH**

#### **Introduction**

The basic vehicle search is carried out by search aware, manoeuvre search trained personnel. The intermediate search teams are deployed where the basic search no longer fulfils the set requirements.

Search aware/ manoeuvre search (vehicle checkpoint)

1. Initial
2. Primary Intermediate search
3. Secondary

Risk assessment

It is important to have clear instructions when carrying out a vehicle check/search. Is the objective preventive, or are you looking for something specific?

Minimum required means for a vehicle check could be:

- Metal detector
- Mirror set
- Cones
- Wire barriers
- Tyre flat tracks
- Orange jackets
- Stop signs

Initial Search.

This is the basic vehicle check and may be intended to select vehicles for a primary check. The driver of the vehicle may also be used during the initial

check (to open the boot, bonnet etc.). The initial check takes about 2 minutes.

Procedure for initial search.

The minimum personnel strength for an initial check is 2 officers, one searcher and one security guard. They are part of the guard or unit charged with carrying out the check.

Searcher:


- speaks to the driver and requests proof of identity for the passengers.
- asks questions
- checks the outside of the vehicle for peculiarities and things like damaged locks or a heavy load even though there is just one person in the car etc.
- checks the outside (underside) of the vehicle using the mirror set
- walks around the vehicle, checking from both sides and observing the reactions of the passengers.
- may ask driver to open the bonnet, boot and doors.

Points for particular attention on the part of the searcher.

- Absence of number plate
- Vehicle windows open even though it is cold
- Occupants wearing gloves
- Strong smells in car
- Occupants behaving strangely, too polite, nervous, impatient etc.
- Occupants wearing clothes not appropriate to the season.

If suspicious items are encountered during the initial check, a primary check is then carried out.

The drawings illustrate one possible way in which to carry out a vehicle check.



### Primary Search.

This may be carried out subsequent to an initial check. It is executed at a location for this purpose and will take about 10 minutes to complete.

### Search Areas


1. Outside (roof)
2. Underside
3. Inside
4. Luggage space
5. Engine compartment

### Procedure for a primary check.

The minimum number of personnel required to actually carry out the primary check is two; one searcher and one security guard. They are part of the guard or unit charged with carrying out the primary check.

Before the vehicle itself is checked, the passengers are body-searched and told to remain at a particular location. Once the vehicle has been moved to the correct location, the driver is also body-searched (respecting Gender) and remains at that location to follow the instructions of the searcher (to open doors etc.). The previously described search areas are systematically checked.


Proceed to primary check. All occupants step out of the vehicle and are thoroughly searched.



The occupants subjected to the initial check are positioned such that they cannot disturb the primary check.



The vehicle is taken inside. The driver is thoroughly searched and remains with the vehicle to follow the instructions of the searcher involved in the primary check.



NB.

The security guard and the searcher must always work as a team. This is to ensure that the security of the searcher is guaranteed at all times.

If munitions, weapons or explosives are found, act in accordance with the 4Cs and SOP of the unit.

## **4. CLOSE PROTECTION**

### **DEFINITION AND PRINCIPLES**

Protection can be defined as those plans and measures made for the purpose of anticipating, preventing or limiting any action or situation that might endanger or embarrass the protectee. It is based on the establishment of security rings - or screens - around the protectee.

The intelligence analysis is essential to set up an effective protection as well as a proper organization and a training of protective forces. A mission analysis should be conducted in advance concerning mission objectives, routes of movement, number of persons to escort and eventual external collaborations.

The concept of protection regards all threats, hazards and embarrassment, to the protectee whether caused by personal design, accident or negligence, taking into account that it is impossible to define and prevent all possible threats. They can be represented by weather conditions, environment (poor hygienic conditions, dangerous animals, poor medical structures, minefields, abandoned buildings...), local criminality and terrorist organizations, etc...

Police Officers in charge of the protection must not interfere with the privacy of the protectee and with his/her official duties.

From the operational perspective protection personnel have the responsibility to anticipate problem/hazards recognizing potential threatening situations and human threats, investigating areas or persons of concerns and neutralizing or avoiding the problem. They must not stand and react, or take revenge, exposing the protectee to dangerous situations.

All the movements must be planned in advance, taking into account that the two most dangerous points at any movement are the initial and final ones.

### **THE RING CONCEPT**

The basic method of achieving an acceptable level of protection is the creation of a series of buffer screens (called rings) around the protectee to prevent an attack or absorb its effects.

There are usually 3 screens sharing the responsibility for anticipating, recognizing, investigating and neutralizing threats. These rings are increasingly difficult to penetrate the closer they are to the protectee. The inner ring contains the protective detail or team, and it is always composed of members of the organization in charge of protection (Close Protection Unit).

The middle ring is usually comprised of military, police and additional member of the protective detail.

The outer ring is composed of physical, non-physical, human and non-human security elements such as military, police and intelligence.

### **CLOSE PROTECTION UNIT**

A Close Protection inner ring, as all Close Protection Units, should have a Unit Commander, who would have to lead and coordinate two teams: the Advance Team and the Close Protection Team.

Advance Team: among the many different tasks that can be assigned to this vanguard element, they can be remarked those following: detect any threat on the route; clear and control the area where the VIP is going to arrive, contact with Local Police or other people responsible of the security of the event that the VIP is going to attend, support the Close Protection Team in case of attack, keep in touch with the Unit Commander and report any relevant

information, etc...

Close Protection Team: in charge of providing close protection to the VIP. Normally, the Team Leader is the Unit Commander, must be focused on the VIP and leads the Advance Team. In case of intervening, the motto is **TO ALERT, NEUTRALIZE, PROTECT and EVACUATE**.

## **MOVEMENTS**

As a general rule, it would be convenient to take into consideration that walking movement must be **short and exceptional**, since the protection characteristics of these situations imply several risks.

Operators should wear simple and comfortable clothes, according to the situation and always respecting local ethnic and religious traditions.

They should have documents and money as the situation requires (wearing jewels or any visible value could expose yourself to a risk of robbery).

When the route is known in advance, support can be requested from other forces in order to recon it before the movement takes place, and to supplement the security deployment along the route.

During displacements Police Officers should use well known, safe and monitored streets avoiding routine, isolated and dangerous areas. They should be ready to change route suddenly (this implies a good knowledge of the area).

They should communicate their movement to a trusted element.

If they perceive to be tailed they have to inform immediately their POC and stop in a secured area, observing the situation from a safe point.

## **5. CONTROL OF VEHICLES**

Vehicle control is always a potential dangerous operation and appropriate procedures are required.

Safety of the operators and respect of the rights of people must be priorities.

The techniques used have to be adapted according to the circumstances (number of police officers, number of people in the vehicle, level of visibility...).

During a traffic stop, operators should scan the area and attempt to locate a safe and suitable control area. As an example, this should not include the middle of the road, the crest of a hill and so forth.

A stopped vehicle should be approached from an angle where it cannot move to run over the operators. Police car should be parked in a position where it provides safety to officers. It could be positioned to avoid a move of the controlled one.

An officer should declare the reason for the control, inviting the driver to switch off the engine and to make his/her hands visible.

During such operation, police officers, if armed, should pay attention not to cross their lines of fire with the operator performing the control of the vehicle. It is a good practice to place an officer with a weapon on left rear side of the controlled car to check unseen the movements of the driver.

Whatever the number of police officers, they should seek to provide a 360° safe ground around the controlled vehicle, scanning for possible attacks.

In night time, the controlled vehicle should be lit (preferably from the rear) in order to facilitate the control process. Police officers approaching the vehicle should carry lamps with them and aiming them at the driver.

## **6. CONVOY ESCORT**

### **PRINCIPLES**

A convoy is a group of vehicles assembled for the purpose of controlled and ordered movement.

Its composition can change according to the operational situation, the environment, the itinerary and the conditions of roads and traffic (urban or rural areas).

The escort's mission is to protect the convoy on the itinerary and during the halts.

In relation to the situational risk assessment, “support components” could be added to the convoy, like:

**Scout patrols** (on 2 or more light armored vehicles): they can precede the convoy to verify critical points and to remove possible active or passive obstacles

**Armed Support Teams** (on 2 or more light armored vehicles with adequate crew): they travel in close contact with the convoy and provide direct defence of the convoy.

**Reserve and Ambush Reaction patrols** (on 2 or more light armored vehicles): they follow the convoy at certain distance reacting in case of ambush.

In order to coordinate in case of attack, all vehicles, including escort should be equipped with radio sets.

All vehicles should be also supplied with active/passive means. They can include:

- colored flares, illuminating, CS and smoke grenades;
- anti-mine metal detectors;
- minor engineering for obstacles removal;
- first aid kits (basic/advanced);
- signs in mission and local language.

In case of a long-distance travel the convoy should include medical personnel aboard an ambulance and one empty vehicle (for emergency cases).

### **CONVOY COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES**

When a convoy is organized, generally an “operations order for movement” or “Table of movement” (for less complex missions) is issued to the commander.

He is in charge of the convoy formation’s layout and of the escort tasks.

Before leaving the base he should check the operational situation according to the last security updates. A communication check should also be done

**The Convoy Commander** personally issues orders to convoy personnel and ensures that all required equipment is aboard vehicles.

### **COURSE OF ACTION**

In case of **road accident** the convoy should be stopped immediately.

He should inform the Operation Centre setting up a 360° security cordon.

First aid to casualties is the priority, with consequent Medevac, if necessary. A LZ (Landing Zone) should be found, as close as possible.

The convoy should move as soon as possible.

Even in case of **engine failure** the convoy should be stopped and the Operation Centre informed while security is provided.

If possible, without prejudice to the rest of convoy, the broken vehicle should be towed while the equipment aboard is distributed among other vehicles.

The broken vehicle will be abandoned if the tow is impossible or the security situation doesn't allow it.

The convoy should move as soon as possible.

In case of **check point held by criminals or rebels** the commander has to stop immediately the convoy.

A secure passage should be negotiated while providing a 360° protection to the convoy.

If possible, the convoy goes through the check-point in calm, avoiding any behaviour that could be interpreted as a provocation. The vehicles must absolutely stay close to each other, in order to avoid a separation from the convoy.

If not possible, the convoy turns back and take an alternative route.

Finally, the commander should re-start the convoy as soon as possible.

In case of **ambush** the commander will use force to continue the movement, taking into account the Directives for the Use of Force (DUF)/Rules of Engagement (ROE).

In case of a **road block**, he should stop the convoy before entering the killing zone and arrange a counter-ambush reaction.

He can authorize the use of force to prevent the capture of hostages, according to the DUF/ROE.

He has to inform the Headquarters' Operations Centre as soon as possible requesting medical evacuation if needed.

First aid has to be ensured to casualties.

Finally, he should re-start the convoy as soon as possible.

## **WARNING**

Unauthorised entry of vehicles into the convoy could be a sign of incoming attack to the convoy (ambush preparation, robbery).

Ambushes are normally carried out by road blocks.

In counter-ambush reactions possible presence of mines along routes should be always considered.

Before off road movements officers should check for possible presence of mines.

## **7. CRC OPERATIONS.**

### **EQUIPMENT FAMILIARIZATION**

Every Police Service/Force shall provide its own personnel with appropriate equipment to be fully self-sustained in mission and carry out the assigned operational duties.

Equipment is useful only if properly managed by the personnel, so an adequate level of training is required to get familiar with it. Training should be continuous, starting before the deployment. This is particularly true for formed units, like IPU's or FPU's where officers have to practice together. Training must continue all long the mission period to be effective.

Best practices from different Crisis Management missions have identified a sort of standard set of equipment in order to meet the minimum operational requirements:

- Police baton
- Shield
- Gas mask and filters
- Leg/arm protectors and other body pads
- Handcuffs
- Hearing protections
- Non-lethal spray (i.e. pepper, CS, ...)
- Crowd and Riot Control gloves
- Crowd and Riot Control helmet
- Bullet proof helmet
- Bullet proof vest
- Every member should have a personal role radio, so he is able to receive orders and to give warnings to the platoon/section leader if he/she's danger coming towards the unit.

Miscellaneous Equipment can be added to the above mentioned:

- Binoculars
- Night vision devices

- GPS
- Hand held detector
- Compass.

This list is not all comprehensive and can vary according to Service/Force. Firearms should be considered apart.

All equipment must be maintained in good working order and in an efficient state of repair.

Where there is a maintenance record for any equipment, it must be kept up to date, which would need to be supported by appropriate inspection, record keeping and competence of the persons completing any inspection of equipment. Logistics have to be taken into account.

### **CROWD AND RIOT CONTROL (CRC) TECHNIQUES**

EU IPU and FPU have, among their functions, public order, civil disorder, crowd and riot control missions.

In order to carry out these duties, the units should have operational techniques based on common principles in order to accomplish the related tasks in a professional manner.

Every single Police service/force has developed its own crowd and riot control tactics and techniques, but some features can be considered common best practices as used in many CSDP missions.

Units deployed in public order tasks should be:

- robust (in order to protect their personnel and people involved in operations, even in demanding and deteriorated scenarios)
- flexible (to the evolution of the operation)
- interoperable (with other missions' components)

Units carrying out CRC operations normally have a modular organization which can change among forces but it is normally based on teams, sections, platoons and units.

What is said hereafter can be intended valid for a FPU (120/145 Police Officers) or for the equivalent mobile element of an IPU.

A basic scheme of placement used by many Police forces is based on:

- front/contact line (2 platoons)
- reserve element
- fire support (i.e. grenade launchers)
- side and back safety elements.

In principle the front/contact line should be unique and compact but, in order to cover a large area and to manage the Units safety and time length on the field, the platoons can be split into teams or squads deployed at some distance from each other.

The deployment of an entire unit (i.e. FPU) embodies some advantages. The entire unit is accustomed to be mobile and reactive, with all the Police officers acting as one and the whole chain of command involved. As a consequence, the tactical process is harmonized.

The use of a full manned unit allows a strong response to the incidents, improves the maneuvering capacity that can be adapted to different and evolving scenarios, and permits a better layout to cover the area of operations.

The unit's Commander (i.e. FPU level) is responsible for executing the missions and is the only one in charge of choosing and implementing the

techniques and tactics needed to re-establish public order (including warnings).

He is assisted normally by a Deputy Commander who substitutes him if necessary.

Subordinate commanders are platoon /section leader/team leaders.

They command platoons/sections/teams and are in charge of the internal liaison (between the teams) and of the external liaison with the other teams, with the Mission HQ or the local police forces, if present.

Platoon commander/section leader/team leader has to consider as a main priority the protection of the unit and consequently he avoids to engage his unit in a potentially dangerous situation if not sufficiently backed up.

A Platoon (30/40 police officers) can be divided in more teams or element according to the scenario and to the tactics and techniques in use.

A good practice in use among several Police services is the sub-division of the teams in binary units or “buddy teams” which means that officers work always in couple excepting the fire support who benefit of free movement IOT to support with their means where it’s necessary.

In CRC operations, for instance, this means that the first officer holds a shield protecting the second one who backs up him with the baton. Both of them belong to the front or contact element.

## **FOOT FORMATIONS AND CHARGE**

The foot lay-out before a charge normally foresees the unit deployed as a block and displayed with two or more rows of men in the front. The front row is composed by officers holding a shield with every member backed up

by a second one with the baton (“buddy teams”) that form the second row.

The unit leader should:

- give loud and clear orders in order that every officer can hear them. In progressing toward the crowd to disperse the entire unit should have a disciplined attitude as a sign of resoluteness;
- identify a departing and an arrival point where to stop the marching unit before charging.

While marching the unit should keep the alignment to restore anyway when stopped.

If a demonstrator stands in front of the advancing unit, this should not stop. The person will be arrested by the support element and moved from the march direction.

The aim of the charge is to disperse a crowd from point A to point B (staying at point B) and to evacuate an area occupied by people not authorized to stay, with the appropriate use of force.

“Appropriate” must be intended as an application of the “P.L.A.N.” (Proportionate, Legal, Accountable and Necessary) principle in order to preserve fundamental rights of people involved.

Regarding the circumstances, the whole unit (i.e. FPU or the mobile element of an IPU) or only one platoon can perform the charge.

In order to reinforce the psychological aspect and effect of the charge, Police Officers can hit the shields while marching and shout during the charge.

When moving and charging, the unit, acting as a whole, can be divided in a:

- contact element (the front rows with shields and batons)
- support element (the back-up)
- support launchers element (tear gas launchers)
- side and back safety elements (close the formation with wheeled vehicles)

Before charging, warnings (according to the Mission and local rules and regulations) should be given to the crowd, clearly explaining the imminent use of force.

Tear gas launchers can support the maneuver. If tear gas is needed due to the violent attitude of demonstrators, launchers should aim at the area between the crowd and the advancing unit or/and to the sides of the crowd, in order to leave the back of assemblage free to disperse.

### **OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE BOUNDS – SELF DEFENCE BOUNDS**

The aim of a “bound” is to allow a unit in contact with the crowd to release itself from a too strong pressure, which can endanger its safety (from point A to point B, back to point A).

It is a short movement forward –regularly up to maximum 10 meters - followed by a quick retreat. It is used during breaking contact with the crowd.

Tear gas hand grenades can be used at the same time to facilitate the break.

In the advancing movement Police Officers should keep the cordon formed in order to avoid breaches.

Bounds can be used for a controlled disengagement of a unit where the movement forwards is followed by a longer retreat: a possible scheme can be

maximum 10 meters. forwards, 20 meters. backwards.

### **STREET LINING, CORDONS AND CLERING WAVES**

Street lining is possible only in presence of a peaceful crowd and for accomplishing two tasks:

- ensure the freedom of a specific route;
- ensure the protection of VIPs on a route.

According to these two tasks, three types of street lines are possible:

- facing the crowd: security street lining
- facing the official convoy: 'honor guard' street lining
- facing the crowd and the official convoy: security and 'honor guard' street lining.

Essentially a street line is formed by single police officers lining at a certain distance from each other. The distance varies according to the location, the crowd and the staff to be deployed.

A cordon is a row of men without any distance from each other.

Cordons are set up:

- to filter the access of an area
- to deny access of an area
- to funnel a crowd.

To filter the access to an area a gap is left in the row to allow only authorized persons to enter. These persons can be checked by a control element.

A cordon can be set up also for denying access to a specific area during a determined time. In this case the cordon should give the impression of strength, power and cohesion.

A third option is a cordon established for managing the flow and maintain the crowd on a determined route.

A good practice is having a reserve element to reinforce the cordon in case of escalation of violence.

The clearing wave is a foot maneuver (march) used by a unit while being in direct contact with demonstrators, in order to push away a crowd whether calm, hostile or aggressive.

It lets the demonstrators leave from different route. The unit commander must stop the maneuver if the crowd resists the unit and should adopt another tactic.

Even here a good practice is to keep a reserve element ready to be deployed in any location in case of incidents.

## **BARRICADES**

The presence of barricades is always critical in a crowd and riot control operation. It is a sign of will of challenging Police forces with violence and constitutes a major threat to the success of operation.

Any decision of breaching a barricade should be preceded by a careful reconnaissance and intelligence (be aware of possible booby-traps and/or exposure to lines of fire)

The approach to the barricade should be prepared with the use of tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. The barricade should not stop the Police unit that, before clearing the street, should cross it.

Difficulties in carrying out such operations can be related to extremely

violent demonstrators, obstacle composition and booby-trapped barricade.

The aim of the reconnaissance is the assessment of the presence of booby traps on the barricade and if this can be easily removed.

A critical aspect in this kind of operation is time. The breaching should be as fast as possible. For this reason the recce team should also assess the best point to push, drag or crash the barricade.

If the barricade is booby trapped, it should be cleared by a specialized unit and not touch by the officers. These should also check the presence of metal cables put in place by demonstrators to obstruct vehicles.

This assessment is performed by a recce team which operates under the security coverage of the entire unit.

The barricaded can be crashed using a variety of tools as grappling hooks, chainsaws, sledgehammers, angle grinders, bolt cutters or crowbars as in use in the Police service.

Barricades can be crossed over by Army Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) or Police Public Order Armoured Vehicles (POAV). In this case, APCs/POAVs take position beyond the obstacle, cover and report during the crossing. Platoons follow directly by foot or by light vehicles.

If gases are not enough to disperse the demonstrators before crossing, water cannons can be used. In this case, their use should be preceded by clear warnings.

## **MANOEUVRES WITH VEHICLES**

When moving with vehicles, certain attention should be paid to embarking and disembarking moments.

The Police officers disembark when safety is not threatened. Aboard the vehicle, the positioning of Police officers should be adapted according to their tasks.

Prioritize the positioning of the shield holders at the different doors who should be followed by their buddies (see above for the composition of the “buddy team”).

When disembarked, the team moves forwards and the vehicle follows according to the circumstances.

Vehicles are used to speed up operations and to protect the Police officers in potentially violent demonstrations. Different tactics should be used according to the characteristics of the vehicle (size, protection, speed ...).

### **ACTION IN CASE OF INCOMING FIRE**

In case of incoming fire, priorities are reaching a safe area (protection) and treating the wounded.

If the attack occurs to a convoy, this should leave the area immediately (according to best practices learned in previous training courses, national and/or international level).

Police officers should not return fire unless a target is identified and confirmed. The use of weapons should be authorized and necessary for self-defense. From this perspective the legal aspects should be considered and Police officers should perfectly know the Rules of Engagement or the Guidelines for the Use of Force and the Use of Firearms, according to the mission.

The accident should be reported to the mission's Headquarters and to the local authorities.

If feasible, the Commander can request for APC and/or POAV support. Its priority, anyway, is to be sure that no police officer or civilian has been wounded. In case, first aid must be provided along with evacuation.

All the personnel should put protecting equipment on (bullet proof jacket, armament) and marksmen should be the first to reach a cover position to protect the rest of the force.

If the attack occurs to a convoy that is blocked by a barricade, Police officers should get off immediately and protect themselves (if the vehicles are not armoured).

It is extremely important to spot the attacker and identify fire direction in order to reach for a cover position behind vehicles or other protective barriers, using smoke gas for deceiving.

### **BREAKING CONTACT: ASSISTING AND RESCUING A UNIT**

In a defensive operation it is necessary to coordinate movement with the use of force (i.e. fire support).

“To break contact” means to organize a safe tactical withdrawal from the riot in order to maintain or recover control of the situation.

The withdrawal should be conducted according to a plan and carried out in order, trying to avoid overwhelming.

As soon as the unit reaches a safe point it should reorganize itself in order to take back the control of the situation.

A second unit can assist the withdrawal of another unit providing cover as it crosses back to a safe and secure area. The assisting unit may engage the opponents. The coordination between the two units is essential for the success of the operation.

This kind of operation requires preparation and planning for the risk of dispersion of personnel.

The purpose of a rescue operation is an intervention in order to protect an allied unit under a present or potential attack.

Basic principles for all these operations are:

- all phases have to be preceded by observation and assessment (information and intelligence);
- good communication and co-ordination between units is essential;
- units should not stay isolated;
- movement must combine action with adequate protection (smoke, lot of tear gas IOT keep the demonstrators away, APCs, POAVs ...);
- HQs must be kept updated;
- operations should not put the unit in danger in more troubles.

## **8. CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATIONS.**

### **GENERALITIES**

In substitution or strengthening missions EU Police Officers could be called to deal with investigations, such as criminal, human rights or war crimes investigations. Not mattering if they are implemented straight away or mentored, some basic principles should be identified in order to set up a common language among detectives from different legal systems.

In CSDP missions the mandate and related documents (i.e. SOMA, ...) should clearly state the legal authority of EU Police in conducting/supporting investigations and dedicated SOPs should establish coordinating procedures with the host country law enforcement services for accessing crime scenes, collecting evidences and interviewing witnesses.

As cardinal rule investigations must be based on reasonable suspicion of an actual or possible offence or transgression. Accordingly information that may start an investigation must be carefully evaluated in an unbiased and effective manner.

A suspect is presumed innocent until found guilty by a court of law. Police officers conducting investigations must be committed to this principle in carrying out their duties as long as the respect and the protection of human dignity of people involved. This is linked to the overarching imperative of maintaining and protecting human rights as a responsibility of the entire mission such as of the single officer. Consequently he will refrain from implementing orders or dispositions against such principles.

Confidentiality is the right attitude in treating evidences, documents and information collected during the investigation.

Particular attention must be paid to the rights of vulnerable groups, like victims of crime, women, children and displaced persons.

## **INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS**

Interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices should be kept under systematic review.

Education and information regarding the prohibition of torture should be included in the training of all persons involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual under arrest, detention or imprisonment.

It is prohibited to take undue advantage of the situation of a detained or imprisoned person for the purpose of compelling him or her to confess, to incriminate himself or herself or to testify against any other person.

Methods of interrogation, violence or threats which could impair the detainee's capacity of judgment should be prohibited.

The duration of any interrogation, the intervals between interrogations, the identity of the officials conducting the interrogation, the identity of other persons present at any interrogation should be recorded and certified in a form prescribed by law. This information must be made available to the detained or imprisoned person or their legal counsel.

The questioning of criminal suspects is a sensitive task for specialist which requires specific training.

Before starting an interview of witnesses, victims and suspects, police officers must identify themselves and other participants at the interview.

The language in use must be clearly understandable by the interviewee.

The police officer in command must inform the persons interviewed of their rights, the reasons for the interview, the procedure applicable to the investigation and of any charge against them.

In case of criminal investigations the suspect has the right to contact a lawyer to be present during the interrogation. The person must be informed of this right.

Suspects enjoy the right to remain silent and freedom from self-incrimination.

Obtaining a confession or any other statement by the use of force, torture or the threat of using such means, or by exercising psychological violence or by using drugs must be absolutely prohibited and made punishable.

Clear standards and guidelines must be established for interviewing persons, especially those belonging to vulnerable groups or categories.

Records should be kept systematically reporting the time at which interviews start and end, any request from the persons interviewed and from the bystanders.

Every interview must be fully recorded, if possible filmed. Suspect's statements containing a confession of guilt should be taken down in his/her own words to the possible extent.

In addition to being adequately lit, heated and ventilated, interview rooms should allow for all participants in the interview process to be seated in chairs of a similar style and standard of comfort.

## **GATHERING AND MANAGEMENT OF EVIDENCES**

The searches for evidences can interfere with many individual's rights to privacy (including private life, family life, home and correspondence). For this reason it must be strictly regulated by the host country law, and may only be aimed at achieving a legitimate objective.

Searches for criminal investigations should be normally carried out with a warrant and other cases should be exceptional and regulated by the SOMA. National legal systems define the meaning and definition of evidence: common law and civil law countries can define evidences differently.

Nevertheless, in general terms, evidences represent all the tangible (physical/concrete) and intangible (information) elements that together prove or disprove the elements of a crime. This general definition encompasses both forensic and non-forensic elements.

The first area of concern for collecting evidences is the crime scene that, by its own nature, can be easily volatile.

Police officers have a clear responsibility in collecting clues and evidences. Their admissibility can also be compromised by mistakes in complying with procedural requirements aimed at guaranteeing the rights of the accused.

How evidences are collected or obtained can be a matter of scrutiny by a court and on occasion not be allowed. This is the reason why following a protocol in the collection of evidences can be vital.

## CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE

Evidences can be divided in 2 categories:

- a. Direct evidences: statement (i.e. eyewitness testimony) based on personal knowledge or observation. If true, it directly proves or disproves an alleged or disputed fact without resorting to any assumption.
- b. Circumstantial evidences: drawn from events or circumstances that surround the fact under investigation.

Within these 2 categories, there are 3 evidence types that can fit within each of them:

- testimonial Evidences: evidences given in writing, verbally or in another way that expresses the person's thoughts, experiences, knowledge or memory;
- documentary Evidences: evidences that documents or supports a truth or fact (i.e. photos, tape recordings, films, sketches, ...);
- physical Evidences: physical objects found at a crime scene, generally understood to be objective. Once collected and properly preserved they could be the only definitive way to reliably place or link someone to a crime other than a confession. They can be divided into:
  1. trace Evidences: sometimes very small that may not be readily apparent. Technological instruments (i.e. microscope, ultraviolet light) may be needed to detect them.
  2. biological: any bodily fluid or other tissue that can provide for a near-positive identification of the donor (i.e. blood, semen, hair, skin, brain, organs, saliva...)

3. drug Evidence: quantities of drug or trace amounts such as powder on a spoon or resin in a pipe.
4. forensic and Biometric Evidences: collected by analysis from the Crime Scene using scientific methods. They can be:
  - ✓ Bloodstains: Bloodstains and blood spatter analysis involve examining the location, spread and trajectory of blood at a crime scene. They can be useful to determine the cause of death, the location of the victim and the perpetrator and the type of weapon;
  - ✓ Trace Evidences: small pieces of evidence related to the victim or the perpetrator;
  - ✓ Latent prints: fingerprints or other impressions used to identify individuals as being present at the scene or used to identify movements and patterns;
  - ✓ Ballistics: bullets or spent shell casings and firearms;
5. DNA Evidences: useful for the identification of individuals present at a crime scene. It can be obtained from a sample of any bodily fluid (i.e. saliva, semen or blood).

## **CRIME-SCENE MANAGEMENT**

### **CRIME SCENE OVERVIEW**

#### **DEFINITION**

A crime scene is a location directly connected with the physical presence of one or more parties involved (i.e. victim/s, suspect/perpetrator/s witness/es) in a criminal act.

A crime scene is the most relevant place where investigators have reason to believe that evidences of a crime may be found.

In defining a crime scene it is recommendable to focus on:

- Physical locations: any conceivable physical location (i.e. structures, forms of transportation, physical areas, ...)
- Persons: persons present at the time of the criminal offence or that have been to the crime scene after the event. They may have left behind or taken with them some clues or potential evidence.

Sometimes the crime scene can be a multiple one, when the event has been perpetrated in different sites and phases. Police officers should prioritize their response after the relevance of locations involved. Prioritized sites are those where there is a risk of evidence's alteration, dispersion or destruction.

## **MANAGING THE CRIME SCENE RESPONSE & EXAMINATION**

When examining a crime scene it is important to follow a methodical approach, prioritizing actions and assigning roles to the operators according to the event.

A good practice differentiates the role of the person who manages the entire crime scene from that of the person who manages the exhibits located at the scene.

In order to reconstruct the event, collected elements should be connected to persons, places or objects, demonstrating the perpetration of a crime, confirming the statements of witnesses/complainants or validating confessions and admissions.

## **RESPONSIBILITIES OF CRIME SCENE MANAGER**

The Crime Scene Manager is responsible for coordinating and directing the examination of the crime scene. He also should maintain security and control at the scene.

He should prevent cross-contamination recording the steps taken to avoid it, reconstructing the crime and coordinating the uplifting, inspecting and labeling of exhibits.

He coordinates with any expert involved (i.e. photographer, fingerprint expert, ...)

The first officer arriving on a crime-scene is called the Crime Scene Manager and is responsible and in charge for safety measures of all personnel and who are allowed to enter or leaving the crime-scene. Besides that the he/she has to be sure if there are no life threatening situations on the spot (injured victims, suspects etc), if so this has to be taken care of immediately.

The officer in charge should have a checklist with specified security measures regarding safe area to seal of the perimeter. After that he calls in for experts to take over the crime-scene and after clearance to enter, he/she can take the necessary steps to proceed his tasks. (Hand over-Take over (HOTO))

He/she will make sure that all personnel and others (e.g. medics, fire-fighters, witnesses etc) who are entering or present at the crime-scene is registered and accounted for.

Officers who entered the crime scene at first respond, should mark their steps and register where they went (entering the crime scene e.g.) and/or

register what they possible may have touched (contamination of e.g. fingerprints.) This should be shared with the forensic experts.

This is to be absolutely sure that the investigators and or forensics experts can exclude contamination by own personnel at the crime-scene.

### **GUARDING AND CONTROLLING THE SCENE**

Due to the volatile nature of many clues and evidences, crime scenes should be seized and sealed as soon as possible, using all possible means, in order to protect them from interference, contamination and destruction. Few points of access should be allowed and some officers should be appointed to guard them, without interfering.

### **CRIME SCENE EXAMINATION BY FORENSIC EXPERTS.**

After a preliminary reconnaissance useful for planning next actions, an exam should be carried out in depth with the aim of identifying the activities conducted by the offender there.

To complete the reconstruction Police Officers should consider the altered scene including the activity that occurred after the crime was committed and a disruption of the scene by, police officers, bystanders or other witnesses, occupants of the house, relatives etc.

Searches should be systematic and cover all parts of the crime scene with the help of experts supporting the police officers, if necessary.

To prevent damage, the number of people on the scene should be limited.

He should evaluate safety issues that may affect all personnel entering the scene establishing a path of entry/exit to the scene to be utilized by authorized personnel. He decides initial scene boundaries.

If the crime scene has some hazards (i.e. unexploded device, ...), the officer in charge will inform personnel on preventive measures (safe distance etc), alert (CBRN-E) specialists to foremost clear the crime scene before letting investigators/forensics enter the crime scene.

Police officers have to use personal protective equipment to prevent contamination of personnel and minimize scene contamination.

Police officers have to utilize single-use equipment when performing direct collection of biological samples.

The scene “walk-through” provides an overview of the entire scene, identifies any threats to scene integrity and orients to what kind of documentation is needed (e.g., photography, video, sketches, measurements, notes).

Most of the evidences have to be collected with measurement scale and/or evidence identifiers.

A sketch of a crime scene is required when spatial relationships or proportional measurements are needed. Spatial relationships are used to relate evidence to other objects; proportional measurements to calculate such things as bullet trajectory angles or to reconstruct accident details.

The sketch includes a scene outline with the location of objects and evidence clearly marked (streets, plants, entry and exit points, location of bullets and cartridges, etc.).

The sketch should include measurements for dimensions of rooms, furniture, doors and windows and distances between objects, entrances and exits, bodies and persons.

When photographing, a complete set of pictures should be taken, including overall (long-range), midrange and close-ups and moving from the exterior to the interior of the crime scene and from general to specific focus. The photography session should occur in an uninterrupted, systematic, focused manner.

When searching for evidence, officers should choose a systematic search pattern based on the size and location of the scene. Some basic rules could be followed:

- select a progression of processing/collection methods so that initial techniques do not compromise subsequent processing/collection methods.
- move from least intrusive to most intrusive processing/collection methods.
- recognize other methods that are available to locate, technically document, and collect evidence (e.g., alternate light source enhancement, blood pattern documentation, projectile trajectory analysis).

Prioritization provides for the timely and methodical preservation and collection of evidence. The search for evidences should be carried out in a way to cover every inch of scene. Following an ordered scheme could be useful.

### **FORENSIC EVIDENCE STORAGE TYPES AND HANDLING**

According to their nature evidence should be secured properly to preserve integrity, prioritizing the collection of volatile or easily dispersible sample.

For the same purpose an excessive handling of evidences should be avoided as well as the risk of contamination with biological material (i.e. saliva, grease, sweat)

In order to avoid degradation It should be considered to store the samples at risk in a cool or refrigerated environment (i.e. dried biological evidences in a freezer and liquid substances in a refrigerator).

Operators initials or ID number should be indicated on the labels, along with the date and time, evidence number, location and evidence description.

### **BODILY FLUIDS**

Bodily fluids (i.e. blood, urine and other physiological fluids) should be collected by trained personnell from various parts of the body using appropriate equipment.

A good practice is the collection of the entire stained garment.

The shape and dimension of any single splash can be relevant to the investigations so they should be described and photographed including a scale and an identification label.

Hair samples are generally trace evidence that may be easily compared if sufficient quantity is collected. They should not be mixed after collection. For this reason they are sealed in small bags or containers.

DNA profiling is possible with hairs that have roots attached. This can be relevant for war crimes investigations when bodies are found in mass graves.

**FIBRES**

Even fibres should be collected with care because they may be easily dispersed.

**TYRE MARKS.**

Impressions can be found in a variety of substrates (i.e. soil, snow, cement or asphalt).

Before casting in a 3D form an overall photograph should show the impressions in relation to the other features of the scene including a measurement scale.

**FOOTWEAR IMPRESSION EVIDENCE**

Same considerations are valid for footwear impressions

Comparison of a suspect's shoes and/or tyres with a print from the scene may determine a “class” match, which means the pattern is the same.

**FIREARMS**

Firearms should be unloaded and collected in a safe condition.

The report about the collection of a firearm should include:

- the safety position (on or off)
- presence of a cartridge in the chamber
- type and location of any stains
- serial number, make, model, and calibre.

Investigators should handle the firearm by touching only areas that are unlikely to contain latent fingerprints.

**FINGERPRINTS**

They are unique to every person and, in case of positive comparison, they can confirm that a person was at a scene or handled an exhibit at the scene.

In general, fingerprints are almost invisible and trained personnel are necessary to find them.

Investigators have always to use clean gloves when handling evidence and to impress them they need a dedicated kit, normally composed by fingerprint powder, soft bristled brush, single-use brushes if chemical or biological contamination is possible, lifting tape, 8½" x 11" card stock papers, contact paper, envelopes, waterproof pen, evidence tape, ruler, identification labels, protective gloves, face protection.

A photograph of the powdered prints before collecting them can be useful.

A suitable container of paper should be used to transport the print. The item should be placed print side up in a way protecting the print from being touched.

**CRIME SCENE RESPONSE AND EVIDENCE COLLECTION FOR PERSONS**

The medical forensic examination of a victim or suspect is conducted by a trained medical (and forensic) professional. When medical forensic examiners are not available, Police Officers can carry out evidence documentation and/or collection.

The search is conducted in order to document the disclosure of rape/sexual assault and evidence of injury and to collect evidence associated with the sexual assault.

The exam includes a comprehensive assault history detailing the sexual acts in order to guide the physical examination.

Furthermore it includes a complete evidence documentation with photos of injuries, genital and non-genital and/or sketching a body-gram with indications of where injuries and/or pain was observed. It includes swabs for any biological material and any trace evidence.

It is generally recommended that sexual assault medical forensic exams be conducted at the latest within 72-96 hours post assault. However, there are always extenuating circumstances that would push this timeline out further.

It is recommended that victims avoid washing using the bathroom or brushing their teeth or eat or drink depending on the nature of the assault. This is not always possible: the comfort and health of the victim must outweigh all factors.

The clothing that the victim was wearing at the time of the assault and after the assault should be gathered and placed in a paper bag/box.

Additionally, any sanitary items or tissue used and still available after the assault can also hold important biological evidence that should be collected and packaged in paper.

## **DOCUMENTATION AND COLLECTION OF PERSON EVIDENCE**

Documenting and collecting 'person' evidence has to be done by trained medical personal.

In a context where there is no medical personal available, Police may need to document and collect all evidence of a non-sensitive nature that will otherwise be lost using narrative and photo documentation or a sketch.

A narrative description should come with the documentation. These observations and documenting never include the genital areas

Undertaking such examinations investigators have always to look for the consent of the victim, explaining him/her reasons and modalities of the exam.

The exam must be carried out by an officer of the same gender of the victim who can ask for the assistance of a family member.

## **EVIDENCE COLLECTION KIT**

An evidence collection kits is composed by items for collecting and storing pieces of evidence and analysing the crime scene.

An evidence collection kit can include: paper bags of all sizes, plastic gloves, evidence tape, permanent markers, containers, envelopes, plastic bags, cotton swabs, tweezers, camera, knife, scissors, a scale and measuring tape.

## 9. CROWDS

### Introduction

The action to preserve public order and safety is primarily targeted on citizens.

### Characteristics of crowds

Location and culture play a role in the action taken by a public-order unit. The action must be adjusted to the situation and to specific characteristics of population of the country in question. It is important to know this culture in connection with maintaining/restoring public order and the de-escalation process.

Crowds can be subdivided into 5 categories:

– **Casual crowd.**

This type of crowd is not cohesive and has no group behaviour or collective goal. The only thing shared is the location and the presence of people. One example here would be a group of people on market square, each of them there for their own reasons. Control of a casual crowd is simple.

– **Watching crowd.**

Again there are a lot of people in one place. This crowd differs from a casual crowd in that an event is taking place. That event is the reason for the presence and cohesion of the crowd. Examples: spectators/demonstrators watching a fire, football match or concert. Control of such spectators/demonstrators is simple, although it may call for both diplomatic and robust action by the authorities.

- **Agitated crowd.**

Many people at a location, a 'happening' is taking place and the crowd is emotional. An emotional crowd can easily become aggressive. The cause may lie in small actions on the part of individuals or a failure on the part of police officers or military to act tactically. Direct confrontation with this crowd should be avoided to stop the situation from escalating.

- **Mob**

Many people at a location, a 'happening' is taking place, emotions are present and there is physical activity (screaming, throwing things etc). Control is not easy; the initial aim should be to calm the emotional states of individuals. Physical force may be needed to control this crowd, particularly the hooligans.

Factors affecting group behaviour:

- **Emotions** play an important role in group behaviour. Protected by the crowd, individuals let go of their emotions.
- **Norms and values** at the individual level are abandoned. The limit to how far people are willing to go is higher in a crowd than it is for individuals (this can even lead to lynching).
- **Leadership:** An experienced leader can whip up the crowd into an extremely aggressive group, but can also calm it down again. The first person to speak clearly and strongly to a crowd is likely to be accepted as its leader.

- **External influences:** cold, wet and nasty weather discourages people from assembling. Forceful action by local authorities in the past also affects the will to demonstrate.
- **Stimulants** such as alcoholic drinks and drugs can make people overconfident. If these people are encouraged by fellow demonstrators, they can become a danger to themselves and their environment.

Every crowd consists of different individuals who react to events and stress in their own way. **Psychological factors** which affect individual behaviour in this regard are:

- **Anonymity:** individuals immersed in the crowd feel anonymous and therefore bolder. Moral responsibility becomes a matter for the group and no longer of personal feelings. Anonymity can be removed by openly taking photos of individuals from the crowd or recording them on video.
- **Impersonality:** Collective behaviour is experienced as impersonal. A sense of ‘us against them’ arises in the individual.
- **Imitation:** Behaviour is often imitated without being tested against personal norms and values.
- **Emotions** can spread very quickly in a crowd. The ideas of leaders are adopted and put into practice. The level of self-discipline is low and violence can spread quickly.

**Demonstrators** can be divided into 3 categories according to the use of violence:

- **Inattentive demonstrators** do not respond when spoken to and offer passive physical resistance. They may become aggressive without warning.

- **Verbal demonstrators** react verbally and non-verbally to directions and orders. On contact they immediately complain of pain and try to draw the attention of the media present. The switch to aggressive behaviour is usually predictable.
- **Militant demonstrators** proceed to violence the moment they are touched. They should be immobilised and removed as quickly as possible. Sometimes this group is clearly distinguishable in a crowd. They are often young people armed with sticks and stones and wearing scarves or balaclavas to make them unrecognisable.

**Hooligans** try to achieve their goals in various ways:

- Verbal violence and obscene gestures: the goal is to demoralise a unit and provoke violence on the part of military or police.
- Using vulnerable persons (women, children and elderly for example): possible objectives here are concealment of the hard core, or for propaganda purposes.
- Using barricades: the aim is to stop or obstruct the movement of a police/military unit. Barricades made with furniture, trees, cars etc. are easy to set up.
- Throwing objects: the aim is to provoke a confrontation. Anything from rotten fruit to paving bricks may be thrown.
- Throwing Molotov cocktails: the aim is to scare off, injure or immobilise law enforcement officers.
- Attacks on personnel or vehicles: the crowd venting its emotions on something or somebody.

## **10. DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOM**

This TTP deals with temporary deprivation of the freedom of movement of a physical person by police personnel.

It depicts three statuses, depending of the level of constraint enforceable by police officers.

This tasks contradict the general right of freedom of movement of individuals guaranteed by international human rights references.

They must then be based on lawful grounds (issuing either from law, mandate or other effective legislation), granting thus that general principles of human rights are guaranteed.

In the performance of these tasks, operators shall be clearly identifiable.

They should respect and protect human dignity and maintain and safeguard the human rights of every individual. They should be respectful of the dignity, vulnerability and personal needs of each stopped person. They especially should take into consideration the rights of vulnerable groups, particularly of victims of crime, women, children and displaced persons.

Any person deprived of his/her freedom of movement has to be considered innocent until proven guilty in a fair trial.

Any use of force in the exercise of police authority must be no more than 'absolutely necessary' and strictly proportionate to the circumstances.

### **STOPPING**

Stopping is the act of temporarily depriving a person of the freedom of movement. The temporary limitation of the freedom of movement of the stopped individual shall be as limited as possible.

## **ARREST**

Arrest is the act of deprivation of liberty.

Before carrying out an arrest, operators should identify themselves as officers entitled to act.

Operators should apprehend individuals physically, with the appropriate level of force reasonably necessary.

Information about the arrest should be given promptly:

- to the authority in charge of the lawful control of this act: Law enforcement officials should promptly bring the arrested person before a judicial authority who can assess the necessity and lawfulness of the arrest;
- to the arrested person. For this purpose a language assistant should be available. The concerned party must be informed of the essential legal and factual grounds for the deprivation of his/her liberty, which would then allow the person to apply to a court to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest or detention.

The arrested person's main rights are:

- the right to remain silent and not to admit to guilt, that silence will not be interpreted as an admission ;
- the right for a person of his/her choice (family, close friend...) to be informed of his/her arrest ;
- the right to contact a legal representative and confidentially communicate with him ;
- the right to have a legal representative appointed "ex officio" if the suspect is unable to pay for a lawyer ;

- the right to be brought promptly before a judicial authority ;
- the right to be questioned in the presence of a legal representative ;
- the right to contact diplomatic or consular officials of the country of origin, if the suspect is a foreigner.

A good practice is keeping records of the reasons for the arrest; the time of the arrest and the taking of the arrested person to a place of custody as well as that of his first appearance before a judicial or other authority; the identity of the officials concerned; precise information concerning the place of custody; practical details of the interrogations (meals, rest, ...). Such records shall be communicated to the detained person, or his counsel, if applicable, in the form prescribed by law.

## **DETENTION**

Mission members should be aware of the minimum international standards applicable to detainees.

They should facilitate visits by legal representatives, family members, inspectors, medical personnel and clergy, in accordance with procedures established by law.

Officers should wear a clearly visible identity badge at all times; not enter the detention facility carrying a firearm, except to transport a detainee outside; carry out regular, periodic checks of detainees, to ensure their safety and security.

Medical personnel should be consulted on all matters of diet, restraint and discipline and immediately report any suspicion of physical or mental mistreatment of detainees.

Restraint instruments (handcuffs etc.) should never be used for punishment. They should only be used when necessary to prevent escape during transfers; on certified medical grounds; or on the orders of the director, when other methods have failed, for the purpose of preventing injury to the detainee or to others, or damage to the facility.

The use of recreational materials, books and writing materials should be fostered.

Special consideration should be given to the situation and specific rights of vulnerable groups, including victims of crime, women, children and displaced persons.

A procedure should be established and enforced allowing detainees to have: the fact of their detention notified to a third party of their choice; the right of access to a lawyer and the right to request a medical examination by a doctor of choice (in addition to any medical examination carried out by a doctor requested the police authorities).

In each detention premises, a single and comprehensive record should be established for each person detained, on which all aspects of his detention and action taken regarding him/her should be recorded.

## **11. FIRE ARMS SAFETY MEASURES**

### **SAFETY RULES**

Handling firearms is always potentially dangerous and safety must be the priority for Police Officers who are allowed to carry fire weapons.

Basic rules can be followed to minimize the risks.

- Police officers should assume that firearms are loaded and capable of being discharged until they have been personally convinced of the contrary.
- Weapons should always be pointed in a safe direction. A direction is considered safe when a mischarged bullet could impact without causing danger or damage.
- Target should be aimed to only when handlers intend to shoot.
- The forefinger should be kept OFF the trigger until shooting.
- Police officers should be sure of the target and its background before shooting.

### **SAFETY MEASURES.**

#### **GRABBING THE WEAPON (*start of shift*)**

First action when a weapon is handed over or taken should be a security check, carried out with the forefinger off the trigger.

After the removal of the magazine and pointing the weapon in a safe direction, the slide should be locked in back or opened position for checking visually and physically the chamber that must be empty. Afterwards the slide is released and the lock engaged.

After a general control (sights, trigger, magazines, slide lock and magazine catch) the firearm can be placed in the holster.

#### LOADING (*start of shift*)

Weapon has to be extracted carefully from the holster.

The slide has to be locked in a back position before the introduction of the magazine. So, the slide can be release safely.

Once the hammer has been un-cocked users can re-holster the weapon.  
Chamber is loaded

#### **START OF DUTY WITH ASSAULT RIFLES (AR) AND SUBMACHINE GUNS (SMG)**

When the primary check is done, the magazine can be attached: the weapon is unloaded and the safety is ON.

#### MAKING SAFE (*end of shift*)

Users have to remove the magazine putting it into the pouch.

The slide has to be racked to the rear to allow the cartridge collection.

Users have to visually and physically check the chamber and barrel locking the slide in back position.

They have to release and follow the slide in front racking it twice.

#### MAKING SAFE (*end of shooting*)

The safety measures to unload the weapon after a training shoot are the same except the fact that the slide is already in the back position and that no cartridge is positioned inside the chamber.

**END OF DUTY WITH ASSAULT RIFLES AND SUBMACHINE GUNS**

If the weapon has not been loaded users have to remove the magazine firstly.

Then they have to remove the safety catch racking the slide back.

A visual and physical check has to be executed.

It is recommended for weapons without a slide stop lever to operate this phase with barrel up in a safe direction.

Once the slide has been released it has to be racked twice and released forward. Finally, users have to pull the trigger and engage the safety catch.

If the weapon has been loaded, in case of non tactical movement or transportation from a position to another, the safety must remain in position ON. The magazine has to be removed and put in back in the holster.

Once the safety catch has been released users have to rack the slide back to eject the cartridge .

Once the slide has been released it has to be racked twice and released forward.

Users have to pull the trigger with the weapon pointed in a safe direction.

The safety has to be put ON.

**TACTICAL AND EMERGENCY RELOADING.**

When the last bullet is shot and the magazine is empty the slide will remain in backward position.

The empty magazine has to be removed from the weapon by pushing the magazine catch. A new magazine has to be introduced in the weapon.

Users have to push the slide stop lever downward and allow the slide to spring forward.

The weapon is now again ready to fire.

In case of tactical reloading (users are not sure of the number of rounds left in your weapon and a threat still exists) users have to eject current magazine introducing a new one in weapon. Magazine introduced, keep the other

## **STOPPAGES.**

### **FAILURE TO FEED/FIRE**

The operability of the trigger can be probably caused by:

- the breaking of the pin,
- the bad quality ammunition,
- bad introduction of the magazine,
- damaged/weak recoil spring,
- connecting parts of barrel, slide and receiver,
- excessively dirty,
- gun dirty/obstructed chamber.

As a solution users have to visual check the weapon tapping the bottom of the magazine and racking the slide back before firing.

### **FAILURE TO EJECT**

The operability of the trigger can be probably caused by:

- broken or damaged ejector,

- bad quality ammunition,
- dirty chamber,
- shooting with an unlocked wrist,
- lack of lubrication,
- dirty gun.

As a solution users have to eject the cartridge by a quick back movement of the edge of the hand. If impossible, they have to rack the slide half way back.

### **FAILURE TO EXTRACT**

The operability of the trigger and the block of a cartridge inside the chamber can be probably caused by:

- extractor worn/broken/missing,
- overpowered or underpowered defective ammunition,
- dirt under extraction claw,
- dirty chamber.

As a solution users have to visual check the weapon tapping the bottom of the magazine and racking the slide back before firing.

A regular inspection has to be conducted on the first bullet in the magazine to ensure that it is not damaged by the loading mechanism.

### **DOUBLE FEEDING**

The operability of the trigger and the presence of a second bullet inside the chamber can be probably caused by:

- underpowered ammunition,

- weak magazine spring,
- dirty chamber,
- tight extractor,
- deformed magazine,
- weak recoil spring.

Users have firstly to identify the problem removing the magazine then.

Once the slide has been racked twice and released forward they can insert a new magazine. Users have to pull the slide backward and release it to fire.

### **FAILURE TO LOCK**

An incomplete closure of the slide can be caused by:

- bad introduction of the cartridge inside the chamber,
- dirty chamber,
- damaged ammunition,
- slide not properly released.

As a solution users have to visual check the weapon tapping the bottom of the magazine and racking the slide back before firing.

## 12. FPU FORMATIONS

### General

When performing a public order task a CRC squad must above all succeed in making a credible impression on the crowd. Formations are an excellent means to that end. A credible impression can also be created by disciplined, uniform and synchronised action. Formations offer additional advantages, such as: control, protection and flexibility.

- **Control** because the commander can easily direct the squad / group.
- **Protection** is achieved by directing the unit homogeneously towards the target group whereby it is easy to transfer to other formations; in every case optimal effectiveness can be developed.
- **Flexibility** because a formation can quickly be adjusted to the situation. Formations ultimately enable the squad and groups to perform the assignment more quickly and efficiently.

During formations, a number of basic stances and actions are deployed.

### Basic actions

Basic actions are:

- Moving forward / moving back.
- Normal pace / jogging pace.
- Halting.
- Using the baton.
- Charging/ halting charge.
- Putting on and taking off equipment.

**Commands:**

Commands for baton and shield;

- At ease!
- At the ready!
- Batons raised!

NOW! is the **execution command**.

The command for moving forward is Move forward!. The commander thereby specifies the direction and the stance. The formation advances at normal walking pace unless ordered otherwise by the extra command Jogging pace!. When ordered to move forward in the 'batons raised' stance they always do so at 'jogging pace'.

*Warning command: Squad/group move forward (jogging pace)!*

*Execution command ..... Now!*

On the Move back! command the unit moves calmly backwards, but always looking to the front and with both feet touching the ground. The feet are slid backwards so that any objects lying on the ground will be felt and can be stepped over.

*Warning command: Squad/ group move back!*

*Execution command ..... Now!*

**Jogging pace** is used on command when rapid movement is required. The jogging pace is executed at a speed such that the formation is maintained and the squad remains deployable for the action. The jogging pace command may be followed by the 'normal pace' or 'halt' command. Jogging pace is also

executed independently, with no command required, during changes of formation.

*Warning command: Squad/ group jogging pace!*

*Execution command ..... Now!*

The **normal pace** command may be given when the unit is moving at jogging pace. After the order they move at normal walking pace.

*Warning command: Squad/ group normal pace!*

*Execution command..... Now!*

**Halt!** After the execution command the men draw to a halt without changing stance. In a front formation the line is immediately restored (if they were moving in the 'batons raised' stance batons are automatically lowered and they assume the 'ready' stance).

*Warning command: Squad/ group halt!*

*Execution command ..... Now!*

On the **Charge!** command the baton is held at shoulder height and the crowd is put under pressure by a front formation moving at jogging pace. Here the use of the baton does not have to be referred to explicitly. This basic action is always accompanies the 'charge'.

*Warning command: Squad/ group charge!*

*Execution command..... Now!*

On the command **Stop Charge!** the unit comes to a halt, batons are lowered and they resume the ready stance.

*Warning command: Squad/ group stop charge!*

*Execution command..... Now!*

**Uniformity of apparel:** The commander indicates what apparel is to be worn. Uniformity of apparel is important during a deployment. Apart from the fact that a CRC squad should make a well-organised impression, an individual departure in this regard can affect the effectiveness of the squad. An individual who fails to put on protective equipment, for example, can be put out of action sooner thereby placing the entire group at risk. Items of equipment are taken off in line.

*Warning command: Squad/ group take off (put on) equipment!*

*Execution command..... Now!*

### **Formations on foot**

Squad formations are comprised of groups arranged in columns or in line. The sequence inside the groups may be modified according to the preference by the unit implementing the formation on a regular basis.

For formations on foot the OPC is always on the left. If there is a fire and tear gas expert in the group, that person always stands on the far right. Any reserve fire and tear gas expert stands in the middle.

**The basic principles of formations are:**

- Group 1 is the ‘group of direction’;
- Formations are formed on command;
- Formations are formed at jogging pace;
- After assuming a formation, the basic static stance is assumed in the middle of the road, unless ordered otherwise.

The squad may use the following formations:

- Approach formations
  - Column (left or right side of the road);
  - Column in pairs.
- Front formations.
- The wedge formation.

A group in column-formation moves along the left or right side of the road, with the group commander positioned on the side of the group which is closer to middle of the road. The OPC is at the front.

*Warning command: Group column formation right of road!*

*Execution command..... Now!*

The **column in pairs** is the formation whereby the groups walk in the middle of the road. The group commanders walk behind the group, the OPC in front. The section commander walks in a position from which he can oversee the entire section. The column in pairs is the formation in which the unit can move to the location of deployment and it is used when there is no immediate threat. The members stand and move in the carrying stance at arm's length from one another. The distance between groups 1 and 2 is arm's length; the distance between the front two groups and the group at the back is about 2 metres. The GPCs walk where they can oversee the group; the PC walks in a position from which he has the best view of the entire squad.

*Warning command: Section in pairs!*

*Execution command..... Now!*

The **front formation** is used to cordon off roads or objects and also to clear roads or areas of ground. The distance between members is adjusted to the situation and may vary from shoulder to shoulder to several metres. The group spreads itself as far as possible across the road to the point until it reaches the buildings (for example) on both sides. The OPC walks on the left. The members assume the basic stance. This stance is the point of departure for other stances involving the baton. In the event of confrontation the stance may be independently modified as necessary.

The **front formations** can be subdivided into:

- Surround protection;
- Flank protection;
- Before and after vehicles.

**Group in front formation:**

*Warning command: Group front formation!*

*Execution command ... .. Now!*

For the squad in **triple front** formation the groups line up one behind the other. The PC walks where he can oversee the entire squad. The distance between groups is 5 to 10 metres. In the initial arrangement group 10 is always at the front and group 30 is always at the back.

*Warning command: Squad triple front formation!*

*Execution command ... .. Now!*

For the squad in **front formation** the groups are alongside one another, group 10 to the left, group 20 in the middle and group 30 to the right. The road to be sealed off is too wide for a single group.

*Warning command: Squad front formation!*

*Execution command ... .. Now!*

**Perimeter security** involves a distribution of public order units around an object. This is done in such a way as to ensure that the object is secure from outside threats.

*Warning command: Squad perimeter security! with implementation orders*

*Execution command ... .. 'Now!'*

**Flank protection** provides protection on both sides of one or more vehicles.

The distance between the members (of the group) and the vehicle should be at least an arm's length plus a body length.

For flank protection the group distributes itself along the entire length of the vehicle or vehicles.

*Warning command: Squad flank protection! with implementation orders*

*Execution command ... .. Now!*

The formation **before and after the vehicles** is essentially the same as the flank protection, in the understanding that the threat may come from in front or behind. When the unit is standing still, the formation faces outwards. When it is in motion, the group at the back walks behind the vehicles.

## Putting on gas masks

**Putting on gas mask (under threat).** The gas mask is preferably put on in a secure environment (in the vehicle for example). If this is not possible, the front line protects the second line during the putting on of gas masks.

If the entire unit is in a front formation then they put on their gas masks in turns. Those in front protect those behind them.

*Warning command: Squad/ Group put on gas mask!*

*Execution command: .....Now!*





Figure 04-?: Putting on gas mask



Putting on gas mask. Man to the left stays in his position, the rest take up their positions in turn.

When the persons in the front line have finished putting on their gas masks, they (independently) switch places with the person behind them. When both lines have put on their gas masks, the commander of the back line gives the command 'Group ..... 5 metres backwards'. This is regarded as the moment at which the unit is once again ready for full deployment.

It goes without saying that gas masks should preferably not be put on during confrontations with demonstrators.

The gas mask is put away in the same way as it is put on.

*Warning command: Squad/ Group put away gas mask.*


*Execution command: .....Now!*

On the command ‘**exchange places**’ the back line replaces the front line.

This may be done for tactical reasons or simply to relieve the front line.

*Warning command: Squad/ Group Exchange places!*

*Execution command: .....Now!*



Passage of lines front group.

## Wedge formation

The use hereof often depends on the assignment and the local situation. The commander is free to make his own choice on the spot with regard to this formation. However, too many formations and commands can make the operation too complicated.

The **wedge formation** can be used to separate demonstrators and force them to go in two directions. During execution the pressure is greatest on the ‘thin edge’ of the formation.

*Warning command: Squad wedge formation!*

*Execution command: ... .. Now!*

## **Relocations**

In the operation order the PC clarifies the relocation tactic. On the one hand he specifies the formations he has successively identified and on the other, the relocation techniques assigned to the groups. During the operation he makes adjustments as required in this regard.

**Relocations on foot.** The squad relocates on foot in the prescribed formations. From these formations it is possible to launch an offensive operation, to drive a crowd in a particular direction and/or gain territory for example.

For relocation purposes, the PC can use the exercises referred to in the chapter on formations.

Relocation through **a street in which there is a crowd present** can be executed in a front formation. The mode of operation in front formation depends on the width of the street and the composition/intentions of the crowd. The objective is to have the formation stretch across the entire width of the street, all the way to the buildings or other physical boundaries on both sides.

When a front formation is approaching a curve or a fork in the road in, the unit should **swerve**. Swerving in a bend is deployed automatically on the basis of the forward motion. Swerving at forks takes place on command, whereby the direction must be specified. The front formation is maintained but the person on the inside slows down and the persons on the outside speed up (to the extent required).

*Warning command: Squad/ group swerve to the left (right)!*

*Execution command .....NOW!*

**Swerving to the left and to the right.** The squad can split up into three groups by swerving to both the left and the right for example. The warning command should specify which group goes where.

On the execution command, swerving is carried out at jogging pace.

*Warning command: Squad swerve to left and right, group 10 to the left, group 20 to the right.*

*Execution command: ... ..Now!*

**Clearing an intersection.** Clearing an intersection or junction should take place speedily and on all sides at once. Demonstrators should not be given the opportunity to get between the lines.

The warning command specifies which groups go where. On the execution command the action is executed with a charge. At the end of the charge a substantial area around the intersection should be under control, so that demonstrators cannot throw things from behind the backs of a line. After the warning command *Clear intersection area!* the groups automatically move closer together.

*Warning command: Squad clear intersection, group 10 road to the left, group 20 road straight ahead, group 30*

*Execution command: .....Now!*

Small side streets and alleyways are passed by, but should be secured and/or sealed off. When ‘clearing’ an intersection or bifurcation it is important to do so on all sides simultaneously; this ensures that nobody from the crowd is able to get behind the front groups. The technique deployed by the PC will depend on the width of the approach road, the type of bifurcation and strength of the crowd. At an intersection/ bifurcation where there are only a

few demonstrators present, the squad proceeds with the relocation in one of the front formations. When clearing and keeping clear an intersection/bifurcation at which there is a substantial crowd present, the squad should limit itself to a single location.

**Motorised relocations.** In principle the CRC squad uses the existing road network in a deployment area. Crowds usually appear in built-up areas. The squad will therefore execute most relocations over roads or the streets in an urban area. It is important to relocate using the right method, and to approach and enter the deployment area in organic, unified way.

Basic points of departure:

- Vehicles used for relocations during CRC squad deployment should offer minimal protection, in accordance with instruction CDS NR. A-702, against striking weapons and non-explosive projectiles.
- Commands intended for drivers are only given by the driver or squad commander in the squad command vehicle.
- Vehicles should at least be fitted with an orange rotating or flashing light
- Radio discipline should be maintained at all times.
- The drivers should be able to contact one another at all times by radio communications. This in such a way that the CRC squad (getting into or out of out of vehicles) is not obstructed. The driver of the squad command vehicle should maintain contact with both the squad commander and the other drivers.
- Radio communications must be possible at all times between the cabin and the loading space of the vehicle. This to enable commands between the squad commander/group commander and those on foot.

- Vehicles used for relocations during deployment of the CRC squad should be fitted and able to manoeuvre such that the operational deployment is not adversely affected. Considering the operational limitations of some current vehicle fleet of the CRC squad , it is not desirable to approach close to the deployment area in such a way that the safety of the squad can **no longer** be guaranteed.
- During relocations the squad command vehicle drives in front, unless the PC orders otherwise.
- During relocations the drivers must be able to control their vehicles, even if they are wearing protective clothing, in such a way that they do not endanger themselves and/or others.
- Each vehicle should be numbered according to the CRC squad and group.

Column formation.

On the command ‘Column formation.....Now’ all vehicles start driving in a zigzag formation one after the other, whereby the foremost vehicle drives as far as possible to the right of the lane, the 2<sup>nd</sup> vehicle as far as possible to the left of the lane and the 3<sup>rd</sup> vehicle as far as possible to the right of the lane. The purpose of driving zigzag is to give every driver a good view of the traffic situation.

*Warning command: Squad column formation.*

*Execution command: .....Now!*

Move block

During relocations on roads with more than 1 (one) lane the command ‘Move block’ may be given. This may happen when a slow-moving car on

a road or motorway has to be passed. At that moment the command ‘30.... Move block’ is given. The 30 then moves into the left lane and indicates to the Romeo that it is in block position and which vehicle is driving immediately in front of him. As the vehicle is passed, each moves independently into the left lane. Once the slow-moving vehicle has been passed, each moves back into the right lane independently. The last vehicle to return to the right lane indicates to the rest that it has done so.

*Warning and execution command: 30..... move block!*

#### Parking

Vehicles must always be parked in the direction of traffic. There should be enough free space behind the vehicle to ensure that those on foot can get in and out unimpeded.

#### Backwards

On the command ‘Move back .....Now!’ the warning lights of each vehicle are switched on. When driving backwards it is important to make full use of rear-vision mirrors.

#### Squad in front formation

On the command ‘Front formation.....Now!’ all vehicles pull up alongside one another. The 10 to the left, the 20 in the middle and the 30 to the right.

*Warning command: Squad front formation.*

*Execution command: .....Now!*

#### Making a U-turn in column formation

There are two kinds of U-turn: U-turns on a wide road and U-turns on a narrow road.


U-turns will only be made if there is no other option or in an emergency situation. In every other case the driver should carry on until a point is reached where every vehicle can turn, such as an intersection. It may also be possible, in the event of missing a turn-off, to drive in reverse, so that the first vehicle is then able to make the turn.

On the command ‘U-turn.....Now!’ the warning lights of each vehicle are switched on.

On a wide road, everyone stays as close to the right-hand side of the road as possible. The vehicle is then turned in such a way that the Romeo finishes up driving in front again.

#### Positions inside the vehicle

The only persons who have a fixed position inside the vehicle are the GPC, deputy GPC and the firefighter/tear gas expert (BRATRA). The GPC sits to the right of the driver, the deputy GPC sits next to the tailboard on the side of the driver and the firefighter/tear gas expert sits next to the tailboard on the side of the GPC.



#### Positions behind the vehicle

Everyone assembles behind his own vehicle. Those getting out on the left assemble to the left behind the vehicle and those who get out on the right assemble to the right behind the vehicle, so that everyone is immediately

ready to assume their correct positions to develop the group into a front formation behind the vehicle.

#### Climbing into the vehicle under threat

Climbing into the vehicle while under threat should take place as quickly as possible. The front formation moves back. On the horn signal from the driver the group splits in two, moving along opposite sides to the back of the vehicle, where they take their positions before climbing in.

#### Climbing out of the vehicle under threat

Climbing out of the vehicle while under threat is to be avoided as far as possible. On climbing out the group take their positions behind the vehicle. The whole group then moves as quickly as possible into a front formation in front of the vehicle.

#### Seat belts

The use of seat belts is compulsory for all drivers of motor vehicles and passengers

#### First names and connections.

The squad commander, group commanders, despatch rider and driver of the squad command vehicle have their own connections on the squad network. The drivers have to use a different radio frequency for their mutual communications so that they will not affect the operational radio communications of the CRC squad.

### **13. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDP) PROTECTION**

Internally Displaced Persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (UN definition).

Mission members must be aware of the fact that IDPs remain nationals of their country of residence and that they remain fully entitled to all the rights and protection of national and international law as if they were still in their homes or places of habitual residence.

Displacement makes people more vulnerable to specific risks and special measures might be necessary to mitigate these additional risks during displacement and to promote durable solutions, without prejudice to other parts of the population.

Mandates can foresee the safety and security of IDPs that normally are under responsibility of host country authorities. Although some limits are justifiable in the interests of public health and order, in general IDPs have a right to move freely in and out of camps or other settlements, the right to seek safety in another part of the country, the right to leave their country, the right to seek asylum in another country, the right to return to their place of origin and the right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.

An extensive concept of **protection** encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the relevant bodies of law (i.e. *human rights law, humanitarian and refugee law*).

Missions deployed in areas where there is the presence of IDPs should encourage direct meetings with the IDP community with the purpose of mitigating protection risks and facilitating durable solutions to their displacement.

Protection activities aim to guarantee to IDP the access to adequate means of meeting basic needs as well and to prevent or lessen the most damaging effects of armed conflict on the civilian population.

Mission members should be trained on international standards such as the UNHCR Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and on the relevant national laws and regulations, policies, measures and strategies for the protection of IDPs during all phases of displacement and use them as the blueprint that provides a solid guidance on how protection activities on behalf of IDPs should be oriented in order to be effective.

The international community must guarantee the protection of persons from forced displacement and their protection and assistance during displacement as well as during return or resettlement and reintegration.

A concrete protection activity generally includes **humanitarian assistance**: health, water, shelter or livelihood programs. All humanitarian assistance activities shall be carried out in accordance with the principles of humanity and impartiality and without discrimination. The primary duty and

responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs lies with national authorities.

International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act or interference in a State's internal affairs and shall be considered in good faith.

All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and unimpeded access to the internally displaced.

Persons engaged in humanitarian assistance shall be respected and protected. They shall not be the object of attack or other acts of violence.

In practical terms Formed/Integrated Police Units can provide protection to IDPs patrolling camps, escorting movements and safeguarding the activities of humanitarian assistance especially where local law enforcement services are absent or inactive.

Arbitrary displacement is prohibited and this includes displacement when it is based on policies of apartheid, "ethnic cleansing" or similar practices aimed at altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected population.

Arbitrary displacement is forbidden in cases of disasters (unless the safety and health of those affected requires their evacuation) and when it is used as a collective punishment.

The authorities undertaking such displacement shall ensure that, proper accommodation is provided to the displaced persons, such displacements

are effected in satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and hygiene and finally members of the same family are not separated.

If displacement occurs during the emergency stages of armed conflicts and disasters (either natural or human-made) adequate measures shall be taken to guarantee to those to be displaced full information on the reasons and procedures for their displacement and, where applicable, on compensation and relocation.

The free and informed consent of those to be displaced shall be sought too.

The authorities concerned shall endeavor to involve those affected, particularly women, in the planning and management of their relocation.

Law enforcement shall be carried out by competent authorities.

Displacement shall not be carried out in a manner that violates the rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those affected.

Reintegration has to be granted and facilitated.

## 14. INFORMATION GATHERING

Being updated on the situation on the field is a major concern for every police operation abroad. Information allows to plan operations correctly and to fulfill specific tasks.

Information gathering is the task and concern of every individual within any police force.

More specifically, information gathering is aimed to:

- acquire relevant information that may impact on the security of the local population, the security of all police officers (self-protection), and the security of other actors including the military component.
- collect general information which will contribute to the overall risks/threat assessment (by relevant level of the chain of command).
- obtain information which will contribute to the maintenance of public order and security, prevent criminal activities and prevent civil disorder and crime, or help in conducting further investigation operations.

As one of the ways to implement the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management, information gathering is a process which involves all the major EU actors present in the area of operations for which coordination procedures are needed.

Coordination with other actors, especially with the military, can be assured through a liaison system.

Main units should elaborate own information gathering plans, based upon the specific characteristics of the AOR (Area of Responsibility) and guidance from the Information Management cell of the EUPOL HQ that will approve the plan.

This plan will notably include the priorities, and define the objectives to be reached, the dates and times of operations, the numbers of personnel involved and the locations where the operation will be conducted, the reporting system and procedures for the exchange of information with other actors.

Police will collect information through patrols, planned operations, contacts with locals and organizations, or the use of specific assets, etc. The information gathered will be analyzed, evaluated and forwarded to the chain of command according to a reporting system to be defined.

In case of major operations, the police component will gather information from all possible sources available.

The police component will forward relevant information obtained during an operation in the daily report. Following the operation, if relevant, the committed police elements will contact and debrief the chain of command and other relevant actors as appropriate.

## **15. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES DEVICES (IED)**

An **Improvised Explosive Device (IED)** is a homemade bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action.

Nowadays IEDs remain the most significant threat to peacekeepers. They appear in many forms, both simple and sophisticated, in their construction and triggering devices.

Bomb makers use abandoned military ordnance as the main component of their IEDs that can be assembled by a bomb-making cell with access to artillery or mortar rounds.

The composition and means of delivering IEDs are expanding. IEDs can be mobile, such as a stationary car loaded with propane gas tanks, such as artillery shell buried along a roadside. IEDs are normally concealed.

Many times IEDs are exploded to begin a more complex ambush or attack that may include the use of antitank rockets, mortars and snipers.

### **TECHNIQUES USED FOR PLACING IEDS**

Terrorists survey and prepare an IED site in stages prior to emplacement.

Many times IEDs are in previously used IED sites using any means available to conceal them (boxes, bags, trash, soda cans, dead animals, meals ready to eat sleeves, paint cans, cinder blocks, tires, broken-down vehicles, etc.)

IEDs are normally placed in areas that slow, stop or position patrols within the IED's blast radius.

To raise the blast to vehicle height IEDs are often concealed in guardrails.

Aiming stakes are used as trigger points (rock piles, garbage, telephone poles, cloth or plastic strips tied to tree branches or natural vegetation).

Attacks are typically conducted in areas with built-up and/or restrictive terrain in order to take advantage of cover and concealment.

### **TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES USED IN CONDUCTING IED ATTACKS**

Sometimes secondary IEDs are used to target a convoy or cordon area as it regroups after an initial IED attack.

Dominating features are used to detonate IEDs such as rooftops, windows, dirt mounds, vehicles, vegetation and canals.

Terrorists generally use detonated devices commanded by wire or radio triggers (long-range cordless and cell phone) as well as victim operated IEDs (pressure plates, infrared IEDs or crunch wire) or IEDs suspended from overpasses, trees, light/telephone poles or overhead wires.

Small/decoy IEDs are used to observe coalition reaction times and TTPs.

### **VULNERABLE POINT DRILL**

High threat areas should be scanned from a distance using all detector devices - optical, electronic - where needed.

Distance is the best friend when an IED is detonated.

## **SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS**

Timers are designed to detonate an IED after some delay

Command – wire IEDs require attackers to position a triggerman in relative proximity to the main charge. Enemy forces often place a secondary IED near the primary device buried under the command wire.

Radio controlled devices are the most common switches used to detonate IEDs and provide stand off for the triggerman as well as accurate timing.

Wireless doorbells are used as well.

Even a suicide vests can be considered a sort of IED when concealed and activated by the wearer or by a second party. Suicide vests are easily constructed using a thin sheet metal frame, wrapping or binding material and webbing or rope to secure the vest to the body.

## **CONCEALMENT METHODS**

Concealment has become considerably more innovative.

Sand bags or trash bags are generally used to hide devices.

The latest trend has been to encase the explosive (usually a projectile) in concrete or plaster or use cinder blocks as the container for explosive.

## **BOMB SCENE ASSESSMENT AND INVESTIGATION**

In case of IED detection operators have to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the scene respecting a sort of protocol largely accepted and called the “4 C's”:

- Confirm the IED presence
- Clear the area
- Cordon the perimeter
- Control accesses

Members on the spot should always look for secondary devices using optical devices and keeping safety distance from possible hiding places: the scene may contain secondary explosive devices designed specifically to kill or mutilate public safety responders.

Only bomb disposal personnel should handle any suspect device that is located. Suspicious items have not to be touched.

If a suspected secondary device is located, the area and contact bomb disposal personnel have to be immediately evacuated.

On the base of the preliminary evaluation, first responders will inform the chain of command, request emergency services if needed and identify scene hazards.

First responders will establish control and restrict scene access to essential personnel.

Prior to entering the scene officer in charge should brief and discuss with essential personnel (e.g. law enforcement, firemen, ...) to evaluate initial scene safety to the possible extent prior to take action.


A search for secondary explosive device should be conducted.

No further action should be taken until the devices have been identified or rendered safe.

Once the zone has been secured, a perimeter and staging areas for the operating team have to be established and all personnel have to be advised of the need to prevent contamination of the scene.

Operators carrying out the search for evidences must ensure the integrity of the scene by establishing contamination control procedures and evidence collection/control actions.

Before deploying the team, the investigator should brief the team and review assignments defining the search procedure ensuring.



Evidences processing personnel have to use clean protective outer garments and equipment as compulsory for each scene.

Collected evidence should be packed in a manner that prevents loss, degradation or contamination.

Evidences collected from different scenes or searches have to be packed, stored and transported in separates external containers.

The search focuses on the discovery of evidence that may establish that a crime was committed and link elements of the crime to possible suspects.

## **16. MENTORING, ADVISING AND TRAINING**

In the framework of crisis management operations, CSDP missions are very often aimed at strengthening local Police forces with programmes of training, mentoring and advising.

Not only non-executive missions have a clear mandate for strengthening activities, but even executive ones can have some aspects related to them. Restructuring, rebuilding and reforming of law enforcement agencies are strategic objectives of many mandates of CSDP missions deployed on the ground and they are achieved by a strong interaction between the missions and local Police forces.

### **DEFINITIONS**

The difference between a mentor and an advisor lies in the nature of assistance. While a mentor is a trusted counsellor, advisor is an expert who proposes solutions.

Advising is based on a short-term relationship aimed at “conveying” solutions to problems in a longer-term development process. Differently, mentoring is a more comprehensive, long-term, one-on-one relationship between a more experienced professional and a less experienced officer.

Mentors and advisors should have some abilities in common such as interpersonal competency, management skills and negotiation/mediation skills.

A trainer is someone who teaches some skills in order to do something.

## **MENTORING**

Mentoring is a process that could be divided in phases:

- 1- creating a partnership between mentor and mentee
- 2- building trust
- 3- stimulating professional development
- 4- keeping up the relationship

For creating an effective partnership attention should be paid to:

- understanding the professional culture of the mentee
- improving the reciprocal knowledge between the mentor and the mentee
- being professional in managing the relationship
- developing and sharing a common set of expectations and goals
- enhancing the communication

Trust building should be based on:

- sharing information
- develop a way of an effective problem solving
- being committed
- offer the right support when required

Stimulating professional development can be achieved by:

- analysing reasons for success and failures
- improving the work together
- guiding the mentee when his action is leading to failure
- giving responsibilities

In order to keep up the relationship it is advisable to:

- learn from lessons learned
- put trust in the positive results achieved
- celebrate progress and growth of the relationship

### **OBJECTIVES OF MENTORING AND ADVISING**

Objectives for mentoring a Police service could be:

- developments of professional skills
- reinforcement of training and delivery of democratic police service
- strengthening of democratic principles of policing

Advising objectives can be summarized in assisting by putting forward solutions to problems related to organisational, administrative and operational issues.

In practical terms, mentors/advisors should operate:

- setting achievable goals and timelines
- sharing experiences
- stimulating the partner to perform
- facilitate independent action
- stimulating decision making
- recognizing the success
- discuss ways to improve

An effective communication between partners should be based on honest and positive messages, timely and specific. Behaviours should be described criticising only things that can be changed.

The right attitude of mentors/advisors should be listening and react constructively in order to find appropriate solutions.

## **NEGOTIATION**

In every human relation there could be different ideas and opinion on the ways to do things. Sometimes it is not possible to achieve what we think is feasible due to interference of a counterpart. This can happen quite easily even in a mentoring/advising process where different interests, professional cultures and educational backgrounds could suggest different solutions to an identified problem.

Mentors and advisors should have a problem-solving oriented mind-set and should be able to manage some negotiation skills in order to look for accepted solutions.

Negotiation skills require a good communication capability that should be based not only on a understandable language, but even on the right attitude towards the partner.

Every human being has a natural attitude to negotiation that could differ according to the priorities he/she has. Scholars have identified at least two tendencies. Some people are more oriented to preserve a good relationship instead of focusing on the result (relationship is the priority). Others see in the result the goal to achieve, without paying too much attention to the preservation of a good relationship (result is the priority).

Obviously these two tendencies can coexist in the same person with different grades that identify different negotiation styles.

If people are totally committed to the result, without paying any attention to the relationship, they use a so-called “competitive style” or “I win – you lose”.

On the opposite, if total attention is given to preserving the relationship, subordinating the achievement of the result, they use an “accommodating style” or “I lose – you win”.

Somebody could not want to achieve any of both, breaking the relationship and refusing a result. This situation identifies the so-called “avoiding style” or “I lose – you lose”.

“Compromise style” or “we both win – we both lose” is the situation where parties keep a certain distance, don’t share totally information in their possess, and accept a result which is not the best but acceptable.

“Collaborative style” or “I win – you win” is the situation where the parties “sit at the same side of the table”, totally sharing information in possess, acting as one party with a single goal. Here the relationship is kept at the best and the achieved result fulfils expectations of all.

There is not a style that is preferable but every negotiation requires the right one. For example, even the “avoiding style” could be a good one if one of the parties doesn’t want the negotiation or is not ready for it.

Three principles standing behind an effective negotiation could be summarized in:

- understanding the mandate
- understanding the interests of the people/parties
- understanding the cultural context

The mandate for a Police Officer acting as a mentor or advisor is given and the way to implement is better described above.

Interests could be difficult to understand because the real ones are not often so evident. Personal interest, for example, could be hidden behind official positions. In every situation real interests lead the process. Only a deep knowledge of the mentee or counterpart can bring to surface the real motivations.

Cultural context can affect the process. Sometimes behaviours that are considered normal in our society could have a totally different acceptance in the area where we are deployed. A basic but effective rule to apply is paying all possible respect to the counterpart.

One of the most accepted theories for “problem solving” (Roger Fisher, 1991) is based on simple four points:

- separate the people from the problem
- focus on interests, not on positions
- generate a variety of possible solutions
- result has to be based on objective criteria

In a nutshell, it can be summarized up in never getting personal and staying on the ball of the real problem, taking in consideration the motivations of your counterpart.

People don't like to be put in front of just an option: take or leave. People like to choose. What is important is that feasible solutions should be logically motivated: one plus one is two in every culture.

The above-mentioned process is based on an effective communication. When it is not possible to use the same language, Police officers must rely on a language assistant or interpreter. Many are the challenges related to that. The most relevant ones are security and interpretation skills.

Missions hiring interpreters should vet them. Nonetheless all precautions should be taken for avoiding leaks in security, such as not allowing local interpreters in some restricted areas or abstaining from the discussion of classified topics.

The critical aspects of working with interpreters are their capability of understanding the professional contents. In order to avoid misinterpretations the best solution is to prepare the language assistant in advance, providing written materials and checking the comprehension before important meetings.

## **TRAINING**

Training is a process that cannot be improvised. Knowing well a subject may not be enough because the effectiveness depends on multiple factors that should be studied in advance. Trainer could fail if he/she is not ready to deal with the context.

The following considerations are valid also for designing an entire course, given the curricula.

The first step is the setting of the context. Here these key-issues should be considered:

- objectives (what for?)
- audience (who are they?)
- topic (is it clear?)
- time (how long?)
- venue (where?)

The second step is the designing of the lecture. It is useful for organizing the knowledge, structuring the lecture logically and improving the communication.

In a nutshell, in a training strategy, two essential elements should be considered:

- contents (logical structure of the presentation)
- relationship (engagement of the audience)

A good trainer should be able to brief the audience and to involve it.

For structuring the lecture logically, some basic but effective hints are:

- provide just the basic information necessary to understand contents
- split the topics in sub-topics
- link the sub-topics with logical connections

Leading the thinking process should transfer the knowledge.

In the delivery phase engaging the audience is not simple and requires certain skills in communications. A good trainer is the one who is able to stimulate the trainees, to lead discussion and to capture attention. In doing this, he/she should be able to balance verbal and non-verbal communications, considering that the second one is much quicker than the first. Position, movement, voice, gestures, eye contact and other impact on the audience, as well as mastering questions and answers.

Training process ends with the assessment of the achieved results. This is done not only using questionnaires and feed-back surveys, but mainly checking the operational behaviour on the field. A lessons learned process should be established in order to correct and improve future training.

## **17. PATROLLING**

Patrolling is a tactical activity conducted with the purpose of gathering information, generic area control, support to other operations (i.e. investigations), preventive presence, community policing or for specific purposes (i.e. controlling the execution of an agreement, ceasefire,...).

Patrols can be executed not only on foot or aboard vehicles, but, for special purposes, even using airplanes, boats or animals (i.e. horses, camels...etc).

Every Police service/force has its own procedures for patrolling but generally some phases are in common.

### **PREPARATION/PLANNING PHASE**

In this phase tasks are identified by the chain of command and an analysis of their feasibility is conducted.

Patrol members/crews are selected and properly briefed by their Commander in order to be sure that they have a good knowledge of their tasks and that they are aware of the operational context (i.e. risks, threats, restraints, ...).

Safety must be a major concern. So a rescue plan for the patrols should be planned in advance, foreseeing reinforcement, back-up or medical evacuation if needed.

Equipment (i.e. weapons, radio communication sets, personal protection, maps, first aid kits, ...) and vehicles (i.e. fluids, tires, lights, ...) are checked in this phase.

Best practices consist in :

- handing over at the end of the briefing, orders/guidelines in hardcopies;
- reminder during briefing of the RoE /Guidelines for the use of force;

## **CONDUCT OF PATROLLING**

In a typical patrol crew should have different functions, such as patrol leader, driver and radio operator. Sometimes a single member can cover more than one function.

While performing their duties, patrols should frequently radio check with the HQ in order to give their position and possible updates.

Using a conventional language can be recommended when radio communications are not safe.

Aboard an international Police patrol it is a good practice to have a member of the crew belonging to the local Police. His/her role is extremely important for legal reasons in strengthening operations. At least a locally recruited personnel could be used as a translator, or help international police understanding local culture.

All relevant operations carried out during the patrol should be included in a written report specifying timings, people and vehicles stopped and controlled, actions undertaken. Specific reports can be written regarding the information gathered during the patrol.

Important information or event regarding on-going activities should be reported immediately, using radios or mobile phones, if available.

## **AFTER PATROLLING**

A debriefing should be done in order to comment with the chain of command events managed and information gathered during the patrol. Reports are delivered to the commander.

Equipment and vehicles are cleaned, maintained and stored for the next patrols.

### **EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**

Patrolling in a destabilized context can be challenging and dangerous. In order to minimize related risks, a list of good behaviors is recommended:

- communication with the HQ should always be maintained;
- situation should be continuously assessed;
- radios should be always at hand;
- being cautious.

Crews should carry neither valuable goods with them (i.e. money), nor sensitive material (i.e. notebooks, photos, restricted papers, etc...). Their attitude should be as passive as possible in order to avoid provocations among possible opponents.

Particular attention should be paid in crossing checkpoints held by potential hostiles. If stopped, crews should not get off the vehicle unless absolutely necessary. The attitude should be firm but passive, negotiating with the counterparts in order to explain the reason of your presence and your right to freedom of movement. Police vehicle should not be inspected or searched. Rely on local officers if present in the crew. Crews should always keep a vigilant attitude in order to prevent unlawful or violent actions perpetrated by hostiles.

In some scenario there could be a clear and present danger of being taken hostage. In this case, it seems better to cooperate with the kidnappers, informing them of your role and impartiality.

If the vehicle is confiscated, it is better to take out personal and duty documents, trying to inform by radio the chain of command, but only if it's safe.

Crews' attitude should be always calm and not aggressive, trying to gather information on the situation.

If personnel is captured, they should stay calm, avoiding provocation. It should not resist needlessly, conserving energy, trusting the efforts of the mission to obtain the release.

## **18. SEARCH TECHNIQUES**

### **Definition**

A body search is a measure carried out by police checking over an individual who is legally stopped in order to detect any dangerous item.

### **General considerations**

Stopping and searching must be based on reasonable suspicion of an actual or possible crime or offence.

Police officers exercising stopping and searching powers must act on the basis of and in accordance to the law.

In the performance of operations, police officers shall respect and protect human dignity and maintain and safeguard the human rights of every individual involved.

Any use of force must be no more than 'absolutely necessary' and strictly proportionate to the circumstances.

The temporary limitation of the freedom of movement of the stopped and searched individual shall be as limited as possible and respectful of the dignity, vulnerability and personal needs of each person. According to this, the searching will be performed in the most suitable and discreet place, by operators with the same gender as the suspect. Derogation can be made in case of clear and present danger.

Special consideration of the rights of vulnerable groups, particularly of victims of crimes, women, children and displaced persons shall be given during the search.

## **TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL PROCEDURE**

Body search has to be carried out in a meticulous and methodical way.

The search of a stopped person requires attention to some safety and operational procedures that should be carried out with great care to the protection of the rights of the person.

In particular, a best practice is to create a safety zone around the subject before searching. With reference to this, the positioning of police officers becomes relevant for conducting the search that could be done standing, against a wall or prone, according to the circumstances.

Closer the officers are to the subject, higher is the risk of being hit or assaulted. For this reason, the person will be stopped at safety distance with an invitation to show some identification after having being informed of standing in front of the police and of the reason of the operation.

While the suspect reaches his ID, one or more officers move to the rear for protecting or supporting the one who is proceeding with the identification.

Police officers will always keep visual contact during the control and those in charge of protection will handcuff the subject, if required.

Meanwhile the search is carried out, they will also observe the surroundings in order to prevent possible threats.

To avoid injuries by sharp objects, the search should be carried out patting down and not rubbing.

Before the search commences, it is a good practice to ask the suspect if he conceals any weapons, and if so to indicate where they are.

It is appropriate that the search is carried out by an officer of the same sex as the suspect.

If the subject becomes violent or resists, then the controlling officer can take the suspect to the ground or against the wall to control him. In particular circumstances, the police officer can back off to regain control with a weapon.

Search from the back is the method normally used when the suspect is compliant and therefore not handcuffed (fig. 1).

During the operation, the suspect is kept constantly under observation by police officers, ready to react to any possible violence. For this reason particular attention should be paid to the elbow, the head and other anatomical parts of the suspect that could hurt the searching officer.

If the suspect looks potentially dangerous, the search can be carried out against a wall.

After the police identification and the explanation of the reason of control, the suspect is invited to show the hands and to face the wall.

The proceeding officer invites the subject to raise his hands to the highest possible position, keeping his feet wide apart and well distanced from the wall (fig. 2).

The search could proceed from the head to the legs, paying attention to the body parts of the subject that could hurt the officer.

Even in this case, other officers should back up the proceeding one, ready to react to protect him in case of violent reaction.

If during the search an accessible weapon is found, this should be recovered immediately and the suspect secured. The weapon is recovered by the officer and brought at security distance.

Another type of operation is the search on the ground, to be performed in case of clear and present danger, once the suspect is handcuffed and prone.

The suspect is controlled with an operator's knee on the back (fig. 3) impeding the suspect to react and stand up.